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Abstract - In the last years, Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
Systems (RPAS) have been developed for a variety of 
civil applications, such as agriculture, aerial 
photogrammetry and topographic mapping, 
environmental monitoring, search and rescue, prevent of 
fires and disasters, environmental research, monitoring 
of artistic heritage and general photography and videos. 
Multi-rotor and fixed-wing configurations are the most 
common platforms, but for the next years lighter-than-
air vehicles (i.e. blimps) could represent an important 
niche market. 
In order to establish a set of rules to ensure the safety of 
RPAS operations, many countries have developed 
regulation for RPAS with a Maximum Take-Off Mass 
(MTOM) of less than 150 kg. In 2015, ENAC, the Italian 
aviation authority, has published the second edition of 
the regulatory issues for this kind of aircraft. This 
edition looks ahead to the forthcoming common EU 
regulation and further amendments will be considered 
based on (EASA, 2015) and further EASA reports. The 
reference rules introduce a distinction between RPAS 
with a MTOM equal to or larger than 25 kg and RPAS 
with MTOM of less than 25 kg. The operator must 
provide to ENAC a series of documents that 
demonstrate that the system is compliant with the 
regulatory restrictions, in particular the results of risk 
assessment in order to motivate the safety of the in-flight 
operations. 
The aim of this paper is the presentation of a novel 
methodology for risk assessment applied to different 
RPAS with a MTOM lower than 25 kg, also including 
lighter-than-air configurations. This methodology 
concerns with ground impacts and does not cover the 
aspects of mid-air collisions. The results of this analysis 
provide a comprehensive insight for mission feasibility 
and operational implications in a set of realistic 
application cases. Practical solutions are proposed for 
risk mitigation of RPAS operations enforcing a concept 
of general validity, also compliant with forthcoming 
common EU regulations, applicable at continental level.  
 
Index Terms - Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Certification procedures, Risk 
Assessment. 
BACKGROUND 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have been hugely 
developed in recent years. In particular small Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) can be used in civil application 
such as agriculture, traffic monitoring, prevention of fires 
and disaster, search and rescue, environmental research, 
pollution, monitoring of the artistic heritage but also general 
photography and videos. Many countries have developed 
regulation to allow UAS integration in their National 
Airspace Systems (NAS). The regulations basic principle 
give to UAS an Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) to that 
of manned aviation. 
In December 2013, the Italian Civil Aviation Authority 
(Ente Nazionale per l’Aviazione Civile, ENAC) published 
the regulation on RPAS with MTOM of less than 150 kg 
and the regulation came into force at the end of April 2014.  
In 2015, the Italian Civil Aviation Authority (Ente 
Nazionale per l’Aviazione Civile, ENAC) has published the 
second edition of the regulatory issues for RPAS with 
MTOM of less than 150 kg. This edition looks ahead to the 
forthcoming common EU regulation and further 
amendments will be considered based on (EASA, 2015) and 
further EASA reports. The use of the term RPAS is to 
emphasize that, although not on board, the pilot is always 
present and has the capability to control anytime the RPAS 
flight. 
The regulation makes a distinction between RPAS with 
MTOM equal to or more than 25 kg and RPAS with MTOM 
of less than 25 kg. For the latter simplified procedures are 
applied if the operations are not critical. Non-critical and 
critical operations are defined in (ENAC, 2013). Non-
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critical operations are those operations conducted in areas 
such that an impact on the ground does not cause fatal 
injuries to people on the ground or severe damage to third 
parties (buildings, infrastructures, …) on the ground. Non-
critical operations are performed in the volume of space up 
to 150 m (500 ft) above the ground and up to 500 m radius. 
The operator must provide to ENAC a series of documents 
that state that the system is compliant with the regulation. 
The operator must provide to ENAC the results of risk 
assessment in order to motivate the safety of the planned 
operations, for both critical and non-critical specialized 
operation. 
Several works have been made in assessment of risk for 
UAS operations. Clothier (2006) provided a discussion on 
the definition and application of safety objectives to ensure 
appropriate requirements for UAS operations. A simple 
ground fatality expectation model is also used to illustrate 
the influence of safety objectives variation on the design and 
operations of UAS. Lum and Waggoner (2011) proposed a 
risk model for both midair collision and ground collision. 
The same model is applied in (Lum et al, 2011) to assess the 
risk associated with operating an UAS in a populated area. 
Weibell (2005) introduced the concept of risk mitigation for 
small UAVs. Size of potential impact area, kinetic energy at 
impact and system design of small UAVs decrease the 
ground fatality risk. 
The aim of this paper is the presentation of a novel 
methodology for risk assessment applied to different 
powered RPASs with a MTOM lower than 25 kg, also 
including lighter-than-air configurations, eventually tethered 
for critical operational environments. This methodology 
concerns with ground impacts and does not cover the 
aspects of mid-air collisions. The results of this analysis 
provide a comprehensive insight for mission feasibility and 
operational implications in a set of realistic application 
cases. Practical solutions are proposed for risk mitigation of 
RPAS operations enforcing a concept of general validity, 
also compliant with forthcoming common EU regulations, 
applicable at continental level. 
The paper is organized as follows. Powered RPAS risk 
assessment is presented in section 2, while the case of a 
lighter than air unpowered vehicle (tethered blimp) is 
illustrated in section 3. The description of the RPAS and the 
blimp is given in Section 4 while the operative scenario is 
illustrated in Section 5. Section 6 provides the risk 
assessment results. The paper concludes with discussion of 
the results. 
 
POWERED RPAS RISK ASSESSMENT 
The buffer area 
The buffer area is a safety distance between the area of 
operations and adjacent areas that are not subjected to 
overflight in normal operation. Adjacent areas may be 
involved in case of uncontrolled flight of the RPAS. The 
buffer area is computed considering the behavior of the 
aircraft during a failure. Typically for a multicopter is 
considered a ballistic trajectory, while for the fixed-wing 
aircraft a glide constant angle of 45 degrees is assumed 
during the falling phase. 
Method for risk assessment 
The methodology here proposed (Guglieri et al., 2014) 
concerns with ground impact and does not cover the aspect 
of mid-air collisions. The method considers: 
• Casualty area of impacting debris (Ac). 
• Population density (Dp). 
• Probability of fatal injuries to people exposed to 
the crash (Pf). 
RPAS dimensions (wingspan or propeller diameter for 
fixed-wing aircraft and diagonal wheelbase for multicopter), 
glide angle (γ) and height and width of an average human 
determine Ac. For further details see (FAA, 2000). 
Pf is computed considering the kinetic energy at impact and 
sheltering. Sheltering is an important factor considered in 
this method. Indeed, trees, buildings, vehicles and other 
obstacles can shelter a person from the impact, reducing the 
probability of fatal injuries. The sheltering factor in Pf is an 
absolute real number. In (Guglieri et al., 2014) Pf is 
evaluated according to a qualitative estimation of the 
operative scenario (Table 1). 
 
Table 1  Sheltering factor 
Sheltering Area 
0 % No obstacles 
25 % Sparse trees 
50 % Trees and low buildings 
75 % High buildings 
100 % Industrial area 
 
The sheltering percentage (from 0% to 100%) is associated 
to the type of shelter that trees and/or buildings may provide 
to people on the ground. Sheltering percentage must be 
averaged over the area of operations, buffer zone included 
(indicatively for a 2km x 2km square) and weighted with the 
population density. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  Probability of fatality as a function of RPAS  
 
MTOM and percentage of sheltering, @ V = 37 m/s 
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Probability of fatality as a function of the MTOM is 
presented in Figure 1. Sheltering percentage is the 
parameter. The graph is obtained starting from the kinetic 
energy at impact computed as 
 
( 1 ) 
Where M is the MTOM and V is the velocity at impact. In 
this case V is set equal as the free fall velocity from an 
altitude of 70 m, that is approximately 37 m/s. 
In this paper the maximum acceptable probability for on 
ground victims per fatal RPAS accident is computed as in 
(FAA, 2000) with the percentage sheltering factor proposed 
in (Guglieri et al., 2014): 
 
( 2 ) 
where N is the number of on ground victims per flight hour 
and it is set equal to 10-6 as safety objectives. 
In case of nonhomogeneous population density areas, the 
introduction of a G probability factor considers that RPAS 
may crash in a specific area  
 
( 3 ) 
The reciprocal of the maximum probability is then 
compared with the reliability of the RPAS. Because the 
components of this kind of aircraft derive from model 
aircrafts, it is impossible to evaluate the reliability of the 
overall system. (FAA, 2015) assumes an acceptable value 
for MTBF of 100 hours. 
LIGHTER THAN AIR UNPOWERED VEHICLE RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
The buffer area 
In order to evaluate the buffer area some simplifying 
hypotheses are considered: 
  The disengagement of the payload and its impact 
on people on the ground is considered lethal. 
 The impact of the envelope is considered 
inoffensive because the kind of material. 
 The height of the people is neglected. 
 The model of impact is punctual. 
The horizontal distance covered by the falling payload 
represents the buffer area. When there is no wind, the blimp 
will stay on the vertical of the anchoring point and the 
payload will fall inside a cone of semi-aperture α = 30° 
(Figure 2). In this condition, the buffer radius is 
 
( 4 ) 
where L is the height of the falling payload (length of the 
retention cable). 
In windy conditions, the blimp assumes different position 
due to the aerodynamic drag that affect the envelope (Figure 
3). 
 
Figure 2  Blimp position in no wind condition. 
 
 
Figure 3  Blimp position in windy conditions. 
 
The buffer radius is  
 
( 5 ) 
and it is measured on the vertical of the anchoring point. 
Furthermore, according to Figure 4 the horizontal distance 
covered by the falling payload in windy conditions is lower 
than the horizontal distance in still air. 
 
Figure 4  Effect of the wind on the horizontal projection of 
the falling payload. 
 
Retention cable ultimate wind load 
The wind speed for which the retention cable breaks is 
calculated by matching the aerodynamic drag and the 
ultimate load of the retention cable: 
 
( 6 ) 
where 
 Air density 1.225 [kg/m3] 
Vw Wind speed [m/s] 
S Equivalent sphere frontal surface [m2] 
 ©2016 INAIR - International Conference on Air Transport                                                4 
CD Sphere drag coefficient 0.47 [-] 
RC Ultimate load of the retention cable 3850 [N] 
 
Reversing eq ( 6 ), we obtain the ultimate wind load:  
 
Wind limitations 
It is assumed a maximum operator strength of   
 
According to equation ( 7 ), it is possible to operate in 
windy condition if the aerodynamic drag of the equivalent 
sphere is lower than the maximum operator muscular 
strength.  
 
( 7 ) 
THE AERIAL VEHICLES 
Four reference RPASs developed by MAVTech srl 
(www.mavtech.eu ), a former spin-off of Politecnico di 
Torino, have been considered for the risk assessment. The 
MH850 is a fixed-wing aircraft, characterized by tailless 
wing-body configuration, two twins non-movable vertical 
fins at wing tips, electric propulsion in tractor configuration 
(Figure 5). Wings are made of EPP (Expanded 
Polypropilene) thus the aircraft is durable for damages. The 
wingspan is 872 mm, the fuselage length is 450 mm, the 
propeller diameter is 230 mm and it weighs 1 kg. The 
AGRI-2000 (Figure 6) has the same configuration of the 
MH850 except that the electric propulsion is in pusher 
configuration and the entire structure is in molded EPO. The 
wingspan is 2120 mm, the fuselage length is 770 mm, the 
propeller diameter is 330 mm and the Agri-2000 weighs 4 
kg. The Q4-Rotor-Light (Q4L, Figure 7) is a multicopter 
characterized by four booms and four rotors. The diagonal 
wheelbase is 0.6 m and it weighs 1.8 kg. Finally, the Q4-
Rotor-Power (Q4P, Figure 8) is the heavier version of the 
Q4L. The diagonal wheelbase is 1.880 m and it weighs 7.5 
kg. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – The MH850 
 
 
Figure 6 – The AGRI-2000 
 
 
Figure 7 – The Q4L 
 
 
Figure 8 – The Q4P 
 
 
Figure 9 – Blimp ZNYL-900 (www.technofly2008.com ). 
 
The model of the tethered blimp is the ZNYL-900 (Figure 
9) and it has a double envelope (inner envelope 
polyurethane, outer envelope nylon). The ZNYL-900 has 
inflatable stabilizers. The fuselage length is 9 m, while the 
maximum diameter is 3,38 m. The estimated volume is 45 
m3 and the ZNYL-900 has a maximum payload of 10 kg. 
The retention cable is in Dyneema® SK99 and its main 
features are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2 – Retention cable main features 
Length 
(Max) 
Diameter 
Ultimate 
Load 
Linear 
weight 
[m] [mm] [N] [g/m] 
120 1.5 3850 1.6 
A winch is used to stretch the retention cable. The winch 
has a maximum load capacity of 20 kg.  
SCENARIO 
Two types of scenarios have been considered for powered 
RPAS risk assessment: a non-critical scenario and a critical 
one. The non-critical scenario is characterized by uniform 
population density of 5 habitants per km2 and a sheltering 
percentage of 25%. The critical scenario is a real case. The 
area considered is that of Torino Aeritalia Airport (I-LIMA). 
It is located in the North-West of the city, on the border 
between Torino and the town of Collegno. The area is 
depicted in Figure 10, while Figure 11 shows the area of 
operation (red circle, 400 m radius), the buffer area (green 
circle, 600 m radius) and the adjacent areas (yellow circle, 
700 m radius). Torino Aeritalia Airport can be a promising 
site for RPAS experimental activities. Flight operations take 
place in the red circle. The site is characterized by different 
population density and offers different kind of shelter for 
people on ground. Agricultural lands (North) are 
characterized by low population density and few trees offer 
poor shelter. Whereas, industrial buildings (South and West) 
offer high population density but also high values of 
sheltering factor. In order to evaluate the average population 
density and sheltering factor, the area has been partitioned 
in 3 slices (Figure 12). For each area, population density 
(Dp,i) and sheltering percentage (Ps) are estimated and the 
average value has been evaluated (see Table 3). 
 
 
Figure 10 – Torino-Aeritalia Airport 
 
 
Figure 11 – Area of operations (RED), buffer area 
(GREEN) and adjacent area (YELLOW) 
 
 
Figure 12 – Partition of the area 
 
Table 3 - Estimation of population density and sheltering 
percentage for each slice of the scenario 
 
 
The probability of fatality is then estimated for each RPAS 
in each sector of the scenario. 
RESULTS 
Powered RPAS risk assessment results 
Results for non critical scenario are shown in Table 4, while  
Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 illustrate the results 
for critical scenario of each aircraft considered in the risk 
analysis. 
 
Table 4 – Results for non-critical scenario (Dp = 5 
people/km2) 
  AC Pf P 1/P 
  [m2] [-] [1/h] [h] 
MH850 2,247 0,559 0,159 6 
AGRI-2000 2,924 0,876 0,078 13 
Q4L 4,907 0,750 0,054 18 
Q4P 15,957 0,950 0,013 76 
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Table 5 – MH850 results for critical scenario 
Sect. Ac Dp Gi Ecin Shelt. Pf P 1/P 
[-] [m2] [people/km2] [-] [J] [%] [-] [1/h] [h] 
1 
2,247 
138 0,236 
1472 
50 0,514 0,027 38 
2 360 0,181 75 0,258 0,026 38 
3 11 0,583 25 0,762 0,091 11 
 
Table 6 – AGRI-2000 results for critical scenario 
Sect. Ac Dp Gi Ecin Shelt. Pf P 1/P 
[-] [m2] [people/km2] [-] [J] [%] [-] [1/h] [h] 
1 
2,924 
138 0,236 
5886 
50 0,799 0,013 76 
2 360 0,181 75 0,477 0,011 91 
3 11 0,583 25 0,947 0,056 18 
 
Table 7 – Q4L results for critical scenario 
Sect. Ac Dp Gi Ecin Shelt. Pf P 1/P 
[-] [m2] [people/km2] [-] [J] [%] [-] [1/h] [h] 
1 
4,579 
138 0,236 
2739 
50 0,659 0,010 98 
2 360 0,181 75 0,351 0,010 105 
3 11 0,583 25 0,876 0,039 26 
 
Table 8 – Q4P results for critical scenario 
Sect. Ac Dp Gi Ecin Shelt. Pf P 1/P 
[-] [m2] [people/km2] [-] [J] [%] [-] [1/h] [h] 
1 
15,332 
138 0,236 
11411 
50 0,881 0,002 440 
2 360 0,181 75 0,587 0,002 587 
3 11 0,583 25 0,976 0,010 96 
 
 
Lighter than air vehicles risk assessment results 
The following tables summarize the effect of wind on height 
of the blimp (h), horizontal projection of the falling payload 
(rxP), horizontal distance of the blimp with respect the 
anchoring point and buffer radius (rB) for three different 
lengths of the retention cable  and for 
a net thrust (FN) of 10 kg. 
 
Table 9 – Buffer radius (L = 20 m) 
L = 20 m   FN = 10 kg  
Vw h rxP rxW rB 
[kt] [m] [m] [m] [m] 
0 20,00 10,00 0,00 10,00 
5 19,32 9,66 5,18 14,84 
10 13,63 6,82 14,63 21,45 
15 7,66 3,83 18,48 22,30 
20 4,54 2,27 19,48 21,75 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 – Buffer radius (L = 40 m) 
L = 40 m   FN = 10 kg  
Vw h rxP rxW rB 
[kt] [m] [m] [m] [m] 
0 40,00 20,00 0,00 20,00 
5 38,63 19,32 10,37 29,69 
10 27,25 13,63 29,28 42,91 
15 15,30 7,65 36,96 44,61 
20 9,08 4,54 38,96 43,50 
 
Table 11 – Buffer radius (L = 100 m) 
L = 100 m   FN = 10 kg  
Vw h rxP rxW rB 
[kt] [m] [m] [m] [m] 
0 100,00 50,00 0,00 50,00 
5 96,54 48,27 26,08 74,35 
10 67,93 33,96 73,39 107,35 
15 38,10 19,05 92,46 111,51 
20 22,61 11,30 97,41 108,72 
Table 12 shows the parameter of the equivalent sphere and 
the retention cable ultimate wind load. 
Table 12 – Retention cable ultimate wind load 
FN ds S VW 
[kg] [m] [m2] [m/s] 
10 4.20 13.92 31.0 
The following table summarize the aerodynamic drag due to 
different wind conditions and for three different lengths of 
the retention cable  and for a net thrust 
(FN) of 10 kg. 
Table 13 – Aerodynamic drag of the equivalent sphere for 
different wind speed (L = 20 m) 
L = 20 m  FN = 10 kg  
Vw dS S FW 
[kt] [m] [m] [N] 
0 4.21 13.92 0 
5 4.21 13.92 32 
10 4.21 13.92 130 
15 4.21 13.92 292 
20 4.21 13.92 519 
 
 
Table 14 – Aerodynamic drag of the equivalent sphere for 
different wind speed (L = 40 m) 
L = 40 m  FN = 10 kg  
Vw dS S FW 
[kt] [m] [m2] [N] 
0 4.21 13.92 0 
5 4.21 13.92 32 
10 4.21 13.92 130 
15 4.21 13.92 292 
20 4.69 17.28 520 
 
Table 15 – Aerodynamic drag of the equivalent sphere for 
different wind speed (L = 100 m) 
L = 100 m  FN = 10 kg  
Vw dS S FW 
[kt] [m] [m2] [N] 
0 4.21 13.92 0 
5 4.21 13.92 33 
10 4.21 13.92 131 
15 4.21 13.92 295 
20 4.69 17.28 524 
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COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
According to Table 4, for the non-critical scenario, the 
reciprocal of the maximum acceptable probability is lower 
than the reliability accepted for this kind of aircraft. Thus, 
operations are allowed for every RPAS considered in this 
analysis. 
The application of mitigation factors, such as probability of 
fatality and probability factor that RPAS may crash in a 
specific area, increase the maximum acceptable probability 
of the (FAA, 2000) method. According to Table 5, Table 6 
and Table 7, the flight operations of MH850, AGRI-200 and 
Q4L are safety in that scenario, while for the Q4P (Table 8), 
sector 1 and 2 exceed the minimum reliability accepted for 
this kind of RPAS. Thus, a restriction of the area of 
operation has to be considered, as shown in Figure 13. 
Flight operation of Q4P are allowed only in the dashed red 
area. 
 
 
Figure 13  Restriction of the area of operation for the Q4P 
In the lighter than air unpowered blimp exercise, a buffer 
radius that varies as a function of the length of the retention 
cable has been defined (cleared area):  
• L = 20 m, buffer radius: rB = 23 m 
• L = 50 m, buffer radius: rB = 46 m 
• L= 100 m, buffer radius: rB = 114 m 
Operations should be limited, according to the wind speed. 
In particular operations are allowed if the wind speed do not 
exceed 15 kt. As a comment, the present risk assessment 
methodology can be extended also to powered lighter than 
air vehicles where the tether is removed and a line of sight 
radial distance is considered for the definition of the cleared 
area. 
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